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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS: THE APPLICATION OF A
MINIMUM CONTACTS THEORY
The jurisdictional requirement of 'presence "for corporations in
civil cases has undergone significant development. However, the
requirement in criminal cases has remained unchanged for many
years despite the increasing size, number, and influence of corpo-
rations. Criminal prosecutions of corporations can only become
more important in the future, and recent cases indicate problems
presented by modern application of traditional legal concepts.
This Comment looks at the unique aspects of the privilege of pres-
ence in criminal trials and the underlying considerations in ap-
plying this privilege to corporations. The Comment concludes
that the civil "minimum contacts" standard is both desirable and
workable for corporations in criminal trials.
INTRODUCTION
The number and size of corporations has recently grown to a
staggering level so that virtually all economic and most social and
political activity is greatly influenced by corporate behavior.'
Moreover, this impact has coincided with an increase in interstate
and multinational operations by corporations.2 At the same time
there has been a dramatic rise in the incidence of corporate
crime. 3
1. See The Role of Giant Corporations in the American and World Economies:
Part 2, Corporate Secrecy: Overviews: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monop-
oly of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1971).
2. Id. See also R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLoBAL REACH 254-61 (1974).
3. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that even the short term direct
cost of white collar crime is at least $40 billion annually. SUmcomM. ON CRME OF
THE HOUSE CoMI. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 8, 9 (Comm. Print 1978). In the indus-
tries regulated by the Food and Drug Administration alone, recent data indicate
that "over-prescription" promoted by the drug companies leads to 60,000 to 140,000
deaths each year. R. NADER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CoRPo-
RATION 25-26 (1976). The few available statistics for prosecutions under the securi-
ties laws demonstrate a similar trend. In 1972 the SEC referred 38 cases to the
Justice Department for criminal prosecution; by 1976, the number had risen to 114.
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In recent years the use of criminal prosecutions as a method to
control the corporate crime problem has attracted increased at-
tention.4 However, the success of criminal sanctions in actually
reducing the incidence of corporate crime has been elusive. 5 This
failure is due in part to a lack of appropriate penalties,6 but corpo-
rations also pose special problems in the general application of
criminal law and procedure.
7
To prosecute a corporation that is engaged in interstate busi-
ness operations, a state must first establish personal jurisdiction8
over the corporation.9 A determination of personal jurisdiction
over a corporate entity requires consideration of factors unique to
the corporate character. 0 A corporation, unlike a natural person,
is an artificial creation of the law" and cannot be arrested or sub-
jected to extradition. 12 In a criminal prosecution, a corporate en-
tity can be brought before the court only by summons.
1 3
In the early case of Pennoyer v. Neff,14 the United States
SUBCOMM. ON CRIME OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 24 (Comm.
Print 1978).
4. The ratio of civil to criminal antitrust actions brought by the federal gov-
ernment has changed from 133:29 during 1968-1970 to 115:89 during 1974-1976. M.
GOTrFREDSON, M. HINDELANG, & N. PARISI, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STA-
TISnCS 61 (1978); see Comment, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J.
CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 70 (1978); Comment, Increasing Community Control Over
Corporate Crime: A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280 (1961).
5. For example, according to Business Week magazine, the FDA's increased
efforts to notify heads of companies of alleged criminal violations have succeeded
in "raising the consciousness" of some corporate executives. Bus. WEEK, May 10,
1976, at 111. However, studies indicate that white collar offenses usually draw
more lenient judicial treatment. SuBCOMM. ON CRIME OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND THE
FEDERAL RESPONSE 49, 50 (Comm. Print 1978).
6. For example, the effect of a $437,500 fine levied on General Electric for its
part in an electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracy was roughly equivalent to a
three-dollar parking fine for a person with a $15,000-per-year income. M. GREEN,
THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 170 (1971).
7. The inability of courts to imprison a corporation and the questionable ef-
fect of a criminal stigma often lead to the prosecution of the individuals within the
corporation. When a corporation is prosecuted, the artificial character of the cor-
poration renders uncertain the constitutional protections that might be raised,
such as double jeopardy, right to trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and the restraints on search and seizure. See 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1230
(1979).
8. For the purposes of this article, the term "personal jurisdiction" will be
used to refer to criminal jurisdiction, and the term 'In personam jurisdiction" will
be used to refer to civil jurisdiction.
9. See text accompanying notes 29-31 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 123-60 infra.
11. See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND *455-56.
12. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 404, 388 A.2d 190, 194 (1978); Peo.
ple v. Consolidated Edison Co., 42 Misc. 2d 422, 423-24, 248 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (1964).
13. People v. Consolidated Edison Co., 42 Misc. 2d 422, 248 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964).
14. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Supreme Court held that the constitutional requirements of due
process restricted a state court's exercise of judicial power to
cases in which the defendant was served with a summons while
present in the state.15 The application of the Pennoyer standard
to foreign corporations' 6 necessitated development of the fictional
concept of "corporate presence."'17 A state court could serve a for-
eign corporation with a summons only when indicia of corporate
activity justified a determination that the corporation was suffi-
ciently "present" within the state.18
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,19 the Supreme Court
abandoned the "presence" standard for civil in personam jurisdic-
tion and set forth the current "minimum contacts" standard.20
The Court recognized that the terms "present" and '"presence" in
civil cases were used merely to symbolize the activities of the cor-
poration's agents within a state.21 The Supreme Court has not yet
decided the question of whether "minimum contacts" should be
applied as the constitutional standard of personal jurisdiction for
corporations in a criminal proceeding.
22
Two recent cases, Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance C0.23
and State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc.,24 are illustrative of state courts
addressing the problem of jurisdiction over foreign corporations
in criminal prosecutions. In the Luv case the court applied the
"presence" standard, and in Beneficial the court ignored the juris-
15. Id. Justice Field's solution in the Pennoyer decision displays the influence
of the writings of Joseph Story. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFUCT OF
LAWS (1834); Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and the Evolutionary
Process, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 589 (1979).
16. For purposes of this article, a "foreign" corporation is a corporation foreign
to a particular state, which may or may not be incorporated in another jurisdiction
within the United States. This is distinguished from "alien" corporations, which
are incorporated in a country other than the United States. For a discussion of ju-
risdictional problems relating to alien corporations, see Comment, Obtaining Ju-
risdiction Over Alien Corporations-A Survey of U.S. Practice, 9 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 345 (1976).
17. The problem arose where a corporation was incorporated in another juris-
diction, but was engaged in business activities within the forum state. Thus, by
definition the question applied only to foreign corporations because a corporation
incorporated within the forum state is a domestic corporation and "present"
therein.
18. See text accompanying notes 47-48 infra.
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. Id. at 316.
21. Id.
22. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 403, 388 A.2d 190, 193-94 (1978).
23. 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
24. 118 N.H. 398, 388 A.2d 190 (1978).
dictional question by rephrasing the issue in terms of corporate
accountability for the actions of an agent.
25
This Comment examines the significance of the privilege of
"presence" for a corporation in a criminal proceeding and con-
cludes that the minimum contacts test is a legitimate and desira-
ble standard for criminal jurisdiction over corporations.
The adoption of a minimum contacts standard in criminal cases
for corporations would serve three ends. First, the standard
would provide uniform criteria for assumption and exercise of ju-
risdiction among the states. 26 Second, it would eliminate the ob-
solete and unworkable notion of "corporate presence."2 7 Finally,
the adoption of a minimum contacts standard would allow states
to deal more adequately with the problem of interstate criminal
activity by corporations. 28
BACKGROUND
There are two parts to the question of whether a foreign corpo-
ration is subject to the personal jurisdiction of a state court in a
criminal proceeding. The first is whether, as a matter of state law,
the state has provided the appropriate statutory mechanism or
procedure for bringing the corporation into its courts.29 The sec-
ond part, to which this Comment is addressed, is whether the as-
sumption of jurisdiction violates any constitutional rights or
privileges of the corporate defendant.
In a criminal case personal jurisdiction is ordinarily acquired by
obtaining the defendant's physical presence before the court ei-
ther forcibly by means of an arrest or voluntarily by appearance
upon service of a criminal summons.3 0 When the defendant is
found outside the territory of the prosecuting state, he can be ar-
rested by another authority and surrendered to the state through
the process of extradition.31
At common law the concept of "presence" in personal jurisdic-
tion required that a natural person be present when arraigned,
when a plea was made to the charge, and at every stage of the
trial.32 In the early case of Hopt v. Utah,33 the Supreme Court
25. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
26. See text accompanying notes 70-72 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 163-65 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 163-66 infra.
29. For illustrative state statutes see ALA. CODE § 7-1 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1427 (West Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11 (1978).
30. People v. Consolidated Edison Co., 42 Misc. 2d 422, 248 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964).
31. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2; UNIFORM CRnmNAL EXTRADrON ACT.
32. See text accompanying notes 94-101 infra.
33. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
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held that the "right to presence," based on the historical disap-
proval of trials in absentia, was constitutionally secured by the
due process clause.34 In contrast, a party to a civil action has no
comparable right of physical presence before the court, and a
judgment in his absence can be entered by default.35
The notion of "presence" in civil cases developed from early
common law rules concerning territorial restrictions on causes of
action.36 Originally in English practice all actions were tried in
the county where the operative facts underlying the litigation had
occurred.37 With the growth of commerce and travel, the transi-
tory cause of action was developed, so that an obligation owed to
a plaintiff was found to "cling" to the defendant and could be
sued upon wherever the defendant could be found.38 This "pres-
ence-oriented" jurisdiction was constitutionalized by the
Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff.39 The Court held that service
of summons upon nonresidents of a state would be ineffectual un-
less made upon their persons while within the state's territory.40
The effect of the Pennoyer holding was that state courts could ex-
ercise in personam jurisdiction only over defendants who were
physically present within the state.41
Because a corporation is an artificial creation that can act only
through agents, the presence requirement made it necessary for
courts to resort to several variations of a legal fiction to determine
whether a corporation was "present" for service of summons.42
34. Id. at 579.
35. See Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816
(1949).
36. F. JAmES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 615-16 (1965).
37. This restriction was premised on the fact that juries were drawn from the
vicinity and were expected to render their verdicts upon personal knowledge of
the facts in issue. See generally 1 W. HOLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
332 (7th ed. rev. 1956).
38. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1030 (1774). In this opinion, Lord
Mansfield still expressed some reservations about whether an action arising
outside of England between nonsubjects who were now coincidentally within the
realm was maintainable in England. Id.
39. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
40. Id. at 722.
41. The Court in Pennoyer states "[t] hat no state can exercise direct jurisdic-
tion and authority over persons or property without its territory." Id.
42. The Supreme Court at first held that a corporation, unless authorized by
its charter, could not be subject to in personam jurisdiction outside of its state of
incorporation. Bank of Augusta v. Earl, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). Obviously,
this quickly became unworkable and the concept of "consent jurisdiction" arose.
The standard of presence for corporations was the subject of pro-
lific controversy in civil cases.
4 3
The issue of corporate "presence" in criminal personal jurisdic-
tion was before the Supreme Court in 1914 with International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky.4 4 International Harvester involved a
criminal proceeding against the International Harvester Company
for an alleged violation of Kentucky's antitrust laws. Interna-
tional Harvester sought to quash the service of summons on the
ground that the company was not "doing business" within the
state.
45
The Supreme Court held that before a corporation can be re-
sponsible under the process of a state court, it must appear that
the corporation was carrying on business within the state at the
time of the attempted service.46 Factors such as solicitation of or-
ders, a single transaction, or the casual presence of agents within
the state might not in themselves manifest "corporate pres-
ence."47 However, taken together so that it was apparent that the
corporation was involved in a "continuous course of business"
these indications would be sufficient.48
The International Harvester decision was consistent with the
civil jurisdiction standard of that time.49 The Court did not ad-
dress the question of whether the criminal nature of the proceed-
ing would require any special consideration. 50 Whether
International Harvester is valid law today is doubtful in light of
the decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.5 1
The issue of the standard for personal jurisdiction over corpora-
tions in criminal cases was recently before the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co.52 Ben-
eficial involved the prosecution of various small loan companies
and individuals on charges of bribery and conspiracy. Three of
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 404 (1856). Adopting a term also used by Judge Cardozo in Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917), Justice Brandeis charac-
terized the standard in terms of fictional corporate presence. Philadelphia & Read-
ing Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
43. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
44. 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
45. Prior to the indictment, International Harvester had been transacting busi-
ness in Kentucky. In fact, the company had designated Louisville, Kentucky, as
its principal place of business. However, before the service of summons, Interna-
tional Harvester had withdrawn its offices from the state. Id. at 585.
46. Id. at 589.
47. Id. at 585.
48. Id.
49. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
50. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. at 582.
51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
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the four corporate defendants raised the argument that they, the
parent companies, were not doing sufficient business in the state
to enable a Massachusetts court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over them. On appeal the court disposed of the jurisdictional is-
sue, holding that it essentially involved the question of whether to
charge the foreign corporations with the acts of their agents and
the sufficiency of the evidence.
5 3
Recently, in State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc.,5 4 the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire directly addressed the question of whether a
minimum contacts standard should be applied in a criminal
case.5 5 In Luv three corporations had been indicted for the sale
of obscene material. Penthouse International, Ltd. (Penthouse), a
defendant, challenged the court's jurisdiction after being served
outside the state with a copy of the indictment and a notice to ap-
pear.5 6 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Pent-
house's motion for dismissal.
5 7
In considering the application of the minimum contacts stan-
dard, the court in Luv noted that the standard represents a con-
stitutional limitation on the in personam jurisdiction of state
courts in civil cases. If minimum contacts was applied as the
standard for personal jurisdiction in the present criminal case
and Penthouse was found to lack minimal contacts in New Hamp-
shire, then the prosecution must be dismissed.58
The court rejected the application of the minimum contacts
analysis and affirmed the trial court's finding of jurisdiction over
Penthouse.59 First, the court reasoned that it is doubtful whether
the standard could be applied in the criminal context: "Applica-
tion of this standard to natural persons charged with criminal of-
fenses might mean that a criminal judgment could be rendered
against a natural person even if he were absent from the jurisdic-
tion. Such a result might render nugatory ... our extradition
53. Id. at 227, 275 N.E.2d at 57.
54. 118 N.H. 398, 388 A.2d 190 (1978).
55. Id. at 403-04. 388 A.2d at 193.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Penthouse claimed that it lacked "affiliating circumstances" with the state,
without which a court could not enter a judgment imposing obligations on per-
sons. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 403, 388 A.2d 190, 193 (1978). See
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
59. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 403-05, 388 A.2d 190, 194 (1978).
statute. It might also raise serious constitutional questions."60
The concern expressed by the court rests on the traditional rules
in criminal cases against trials in absentia.61 These rules have
recognized that the failure to insure the presence of the accused
at his trial may substantially impair his rights.62
Second, the court stated that Penthouse was sufficiently "pres-
ent" in New Hampshire to be subject to prosecution, based upon
testimony in the record that "Penthouse does more than publish
the magazine in question."63 Penthouse was involved in distribu-
tion of the allegedly obscene materials but was insulated from
"contact" with New Hampshire by acting through independent
contractors.64 The court relied on the holdings of civil cases that
have liberalized the due process criteria for jurisdiction by elimi-
nating the distinction between independent contractors and
agents.65 If such a distinction were maintained, a corporation
could, by using a proper degree of care and "independent contrac-
tors" to carry out its business functions, eliminate nearly all phys-
ical contacts with all but one state.66
Finally, the court in Luv noted that the alleged commission of
acts by Penthouse represented a compelling "circumstance of af-
filiation" with New Hampshire. 67 It is interesting that the court's
language is similar to that used by the Supreme Court in Hanson
v. Denckla,68 a civil case addressing a minimum contacts issue.
Although the Luv court rejected the minimum contacts analysis,
the language implies that if the standard had been used, the court
still would have found Penthouse subject to New Hampshire ju-
risdiction. Apparently, the underlying reason for the court's deci-
sion involved an apprehension of the problem a minimum
contacts standard might pose for natural persons.69 However the
court seems to suggest that a minimum contacts analysis is other-
wise appropriate and desirable for corporations.
The International Harvester, Luv, and Beneficial cases indicate
three possible approaches to the standard for criminal jurisdic-
tion over corporations. International Harvester suggests a set of
60. Id.
61. See text accompanying notes 93-117 infra.
62. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). In recent cases the rule has become in-
creasingly less favorable for the defendant. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S.
17 (1973).
63. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 404-09, 388 A.2d 190, 194-97 (1978).
64. Id.
65. Mulhern v. Holland America Cruises, 393 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (D.N.H. 1975);
see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967).
66. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 1967).
67. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 405, 388 A.2d 190, 195 (1978).
68. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
69. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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defined indicia that would allow the exercise of jurisdiction when
a corporation is found to be "doing business" within a state.70
The Beneficial case ignores the issue of a jurisdictional standard
entirely by rephrasing the problem in terms of legal accountabil-
ity.71 The Luv case suggests the application of the more modem
"circumstances of affiliation" standard that makes exercise of ju-
risdiction reasonable, but retains the '"presence" term to avoid the
problem of applying minimum contacts to natural persons.72
The important question to be decided is whether a corporate
defendant has additional rights in a criminal case that might pre-
clude adoption of the minimum contacts standard.73 If the juris-
dictional rights of corporations are similar or the same in both
criminal and civil cases, then the minimum contacts standard
should be applied.
MINIMUM CONTACTS
Since Pennoyer v. Neff7 4 the Supreme Court has held that the
due process clause places some limit on the jurisdictional power
of state courts over persons outside of their territory.75 The ques-
tion in Pennoyer involved the degree of affiliation that a nonresi-
dent must have with a state before the courts of.that state could
exercise in personam jurisdiction over him by service of sum-
mons.76 In applying the Pennoyer standard of presence, courts re-
sorted to factual items such as local offices, employees, telephone
book listings, bank accounts, or other operations to justify the
conclusion that a foreign corporation was present in the state.77
In civil cases in a continuing process of evolution, the Supreme
Court accepted and then abandoned "presence," "doing busi-
ness," and "consent" as the constitutional standard of in per-
sonam jurisdiction,78 although the standard was usually
70. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585-89 (1914).
71. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 227, 275 N.E.2d 33, 56-
57 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
72. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 404-05, 388 A.2d 190, 194 (1978).
73. See text accompanying notes 93-117 infra.
74. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
75. Id. at 724.
76. Id.
77. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882); see cases cited note 42 supra.
78. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See also cases
cited note 42 supra.
characterized in terms of "presence. '79 The Court in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. WashingtonO held that due process requires
only that a foreign corporation have certain minimum contacts
with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 81
The creation of the minimum contacts standard involved a rec-
ognition of the fictional character of a corporation.82 Unlike a nat-
ural person, a corporation's "presence" within a state can be
manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who
are authorized to act for it.83
Several subsequent Supreme Court decisions have elaborated
upon the International Shoe standard.84 The broad jurisdictional
authority conferred upon the states seemed to lead to the demise
of all restrictions when the Court decided McGee v. International
Life Insurance C0.85 In McGee jurisdiction was premised upon a
single transaction conducted by mail; the defendant corporation
had no other connections with the forum state.8
6
One year later in Hanson v. Denckla,87 the Court again indi-
cated that the extent of state court jurisdiction was not without
limitation.88 In Hanson the Court held that the Florida courts
could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
trustees who had no office and transacted no business there, al-
though the trust beneficiaries were domiciled in Florida.89 The
Court distinguished the facts from those in McGee by noting that
the cause of action did not arise out of an act done or a transac-
tion consummated in the forum state.90
The substance of the minimum contacts standard requires that
a court find the corporation has sufficient affiliation with the fo-
rum state before in personam jurisdiction can be acquired by
service of summons or other reasonable notice.9 1 The courts in
79. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
80. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
81. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Recently the Supreme Court extended the International Shoe "reasonable-
ness" standard to in rem jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Shaf-
fer's implication for in personam jurisdiction is primarily that the presence of
property alone is not sufficient to be the basis of state court jurisdiction. Id. at
208-09, 212.
85. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
86. Id. at 221.
87. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
88. Id. at 251.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
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civil cases no longer look to manifestations of "presence" in mak-
ing this determination, but examine the corporation's relation-
ships with the state that make the exercise of jurisdiction
reasonable. 92
AN ARGUMENT FOR THE APPLICATION OF MINIUnM CONTACTS
The decision whether a minimum contacts standard should be
applied to corporations in a criminal case involves three crucial
issues: 93 first, whether a foreign corporation has jurisdictional
rights or privileges in a criminal proceeding,94 other than those
found in a civil proceeding; second whether a standard for corpo-
rations different from that for natural persons is justifiable; third,
whether the minimum contacts standard is workable in criminal
jurisprudence.
Trials in Absentia
The minimum contacts standard was drafted in response to a
continual struggle by the courts to adapt the Pennoyer concept of
"presence" to the metaphysical character of corporations during a
period when interstate activity by corporations was increasing
significantly.9 5 In contrast, the historical privilege of presence at
criminal trials developed from a disapproval of trials in absentia.
96
The presence of the defendant at his own trial has long been an
important part of the Anglo-Saxon criminal justice system.
9 7
Originally, the defendant's presence was functionally necessary
because trial procedures involved such early practices as trial by
water or fire ordeal.9 8 When these procedures were eliminated,
the rationale focused on the defendant's presence as essential for
(1958); see Comment, Minimum Contacts Analysis of In Personam Jurisdiction
Over Individuals Based on Presence, 33 APE. L REV. 159 (1979).
92. See authorities cited note 91 supra.
93. See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
94. Id.
95. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
96. See Cohen, Trial In Absentia Re-Examined, 40 TENN. L REV. 155 (1973) See
also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
97. See Goldin, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in Felony
Cases, 16 CoLui. L. REV. 18 (1916), where the history of presence at a criminal
trial is discussed more fully.
98. For ordeal by fire, the accused was innocent if he was not burned. For
ordeal by water, he was innocent if he was not burned by boiling water or if he
floated without swimming When thrown into a pond. See generally 4 W. BLAcK-
STONE, COMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *336-42.
the legitimacy of the proceedings.99 In addition, because most of-
fenses at that time were sanctioned by capital punishment, a trial
and verdict in the defendant's absence would have been point-
less. 0 0
A number of early Supreme Court cases considered the consti-
tutional bases of the privilege of presence. In 1884, the presence
of the accused was characterized as a constitutionally secured
"right" in Hopt v. Utah.'0 ' The Hopt holding was reaffirmed in
Lewis v. United States,0 2 in which the Supreme Court stated that
it was not within the power of the accused to waive personal pres-
ence at a felony trial.103 However, in 1912 in Diaz v. United
States,0 4 the Court modified its position and limited the broad
holding of Lewis to cases where the defendant was in custody or
where he was charged with a capital offense.105 The power of the
accused to waive his privilege of presence, here authorized by
statute, was acknowledged by the Court.106
A number of later cases allowed the waiver of presence during
certain portions of the trial, such as during rendition of the ver-
dict or while the jury viewed the scene of the crime. 0 7 Recently,
in Illinois v. Allen, 0 8 the Supreme Court reviewed the guidelines
for trial of a disruptive defendant'0 9 and held that the removal of
a defendant from the courtroom was reasonable in such a circum-
stance."10
The privilege of presence has been characterized as stemming
from the sixth amendment confrontation clause."' The sixth
amendment provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him."12 However, the intended purpose of this
99. This analysis was proposed by Goldin, Presence of the Defendant at Rendi-
tion of the Verdict in Felony Cases, 16 CoLum. L REV. 18 (1916).
100. See Shetsky v. Utecht, 228 Minn. 44, 36 N.W.2d 126 (1949).
101. 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884).
102. 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
103. Id. at 372. In Lewis, however, the Court relied on "the dictates of.human-
ity" and "[a] leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure."
Id.
104. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
105. Id. at 455.
106. Id.
107. Valdez v. United States, 244 U.S. 432 (1917); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915).
108. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
109. The Court noted three possible solutions: (1) bind and gag the defendant,
thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the
courtroom until he promised to conduct himself properly. The Court acknowl-
edged that each alternative had its shortcomings. Id. at 344-46.
110. Id. at 347.
111. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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clause is not entirely clear.113 What is apparent is that in the past
ninety years the Supreme Court has significantly changed its po-
sition on the privilege of presence." 4
Recently, in Taylor v. United States,"5 a defendant voluntarily
absented himself after the trial had begun in his presence. The
Supreme Court rejected an argument that the right to confronta-
tion requires an express warning to a defendant that he has a
"right to presence" and that the trial will continue in his ab-
sence.1 6 The Court clearly indicated that no warning was re-
quired and that the defendant voluntarily waived any privilege of
presence by absenting himself.117
It is evident that the confrontation clause requires that a de-
fendant be permitted to attend his own trial,"i8 but as long as
presence is possible, the Constitution leaves the states relatively
free to fashion their own rules of waiver." 9 At the outset, it is
questionable whether a corporation has any right to presence at a
criminal trial if an appearance is waived. Whether mere notice of
the proceedings by service of summons and a voluntary failure to
appear would be a sufficient waiver of the corporation's privilege
is a question yet to be answered.
The Corporation: A Separate Standard
In felony prosecutions, the Supreme Court cases have attached
some importance to the initial presence of the defendant at the
proceeding, although waiver of continued presence or of presence
at a specific portion of the trial has clearly been allowed. 120 Part
of the remaining uncertainty arises from the fact that there are
two components to the privilege of presence in a criminal trial.
The first is the applicable provisions of the code of criminal proce-
113. Justice Harlan, concurring in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970),
states: "[Tihe Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment. History
seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope. .. "
114. The privilege was occasionally termed a right, but the recent holdings have
used the term "privilege" or indicated that the "right" can be waived.
115. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
116. Id. at 19-20. This argument had been upheld in United States v. McPher-
son, 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1969), but the Supreme Court, citing Diaz, rejected the
holding.
117. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973).
118. Even this privilege is subject to limitation if the defendant insists upon
acting in a disorderly manner. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
119. See text accompanying notes 120-22 infra.
120. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
dure.121 The second is the constitutional privilege. The Taylor
case involved the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provide for waiver of continued presence by a defendant "initially
present."'122 Whether the rendering of a criminal judgment
against a natural person absent from the jurisdiction would be
constitutionally permissible is still an open question.
The application of the privilege of presence to corporations re-
quires both a due process and an equal protection evaluation. For
purposes of due process, the question is whether a criminal judg-
ment rendered against a corporation not "present" within a state
or rendered in the corporation's absence upon failure to appear
would be fair and reasonable. 123 An equal protection argument is
available to a corporation where a state by statute requires a nat-
ural person's presence at criminal proceedings but arbitrarily al-
lows judgment to be pronounced against a corporation for failure
to appear.124 With either a due process or an equal protection
claim, the issue is whether the Constitution requires that corpora-
tions be afforded the same right or privilege of presence as natu-
ral persons.
The application of other constitutional rights and privileges to
corporations suggests that a separate standard of jurisdiction may
be reasonable and justifiable. The fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures was early held to ap-
ply to corporations as well as to individuals,125 but the degree of
protection for corporations was minimal compared to that re-
ceived by individuals.26 This standard of "lower reasonableness"
originally put corporations in a less favorable constitutional posi-
tion, although the significance of this difference diminished as the
fourth amendment shield over business documents of individuals
eroded.127 This dual fourth amendment standard does indicate
that the status of a corporation, as an invention of the state, may
affect a corporation's constitutional rights or privileges.
Another area in which a dual standard has been developed is in
the application of the fifth amendment provision for the privilege
121. In the Taylor case, the Court's discussion was largely directed to this first
component, which raises the question of whether the holding may have reached
only the statutory issue.
122. FED. R. CPim. P. 43.
123. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
124. This possibility is illustrated in People v. Consolidated Edison Co., 42 Misc,
2d 422, 248 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964), where the court held that service of a criminal sum-
mons confers personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant, even though it
would not confer personal jurisdiction over a natural person.
125. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
126. Id. at 76.
127. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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against self-incrimination in criminal cases.128 The Supreme
Court has consistently held that this privilege does not extend to
"artificial persons" such as corporations and collective entities.129
In early cases the Court analyzed the fifth amendment protection
of corporate documents by asking whether the "person" asserting
the privilege was entitled to do so, not whether the documents
themselves were privileged.13 0 In Hale v. Henkel,131 the Court
based its decision on the rule that a person cannot invoke the
privilege on behalf of another, in this case an agent on behalf of a
corporation.Z32
In United States v. White,133 the Supreme Court advanced a
new theory for denying corporations any privilege against self-in-
crimination.13 4 The Court, holding that a labor union could not
assert the fifth amendment privilege, based its decision on the na-
ture of the union as an "artificial entity."135 The Court indicated
that the holding would apply to corporations as well.136 The fifth
amendment protection was designed to prevent the use of legal
process to force from the lips of the accused individual the evi-
dence necessary to convict him. Thus the privilege of self-incrimi-
nation is a purely personal one; it cannot be utilized by or on
behalf of a corporation. 37
The fifth amendment analysis developed by the Supreme Court
in the White case is persuasive authority for a separate standard
for the corporate privilege of presence. Historically, the privilege
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
129. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694 (1944).
130. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 69-70.
133. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
134. Id. at 698-701.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. The Court stated:
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a per-
sonal one, applying only to natural individuals. It grows out of the high
sentiment and regard of our jurisprudence for conducting criminal trials
and investigatory proceedings upon a plane of dignity, humanity and im-
partiality. It is designed to prevent the use of legal process to force from
the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict
him .... Physical torture and other less violent but equally reprehensible
modes of compelling the production of incriminating evidence are thereby
avoided.
Id. at 698.
of presence evolved from the functional requirement of trial pro-
cedures for having a physical body before the court.138 Later ra-
tionales suggested by the purpose of the confrontation clause
focus on the defendant's role in his own trial. The physical pres-
ence of the defendant legitimizes the fairness of the proceedings
because he can observe improper conduct by the judge and
jury.139 He is able to calm certain defense witnesses14 0 and
render assistance to his attorney by correcting errors of fact or
law.14 1 When required, the defendant can supersede his attorney
and question witnesses himself.142 If the defendant is a corpora-
tion, these underlying rationales for the privilege of presence
would not be applicable as a corporation is necessarily repre-
sented by agents.
It can be argued that the interests secured by the privilege of
presence attach to the corporation's directors or officers. This ar-
gument was raised in connection with the fifth amendment pro-
tection, but was rejected by the Court.143 The directors or officers
are wholly able to exercise their individual privilege of presence
by taking part in the proceedings. The corporation itself as an ar-
tificial entity cannot physically act to protect its interests.144
The Corporation: The Public Interest
In addition to the inapplicability of the rationale for the privi-
lege of presence to corporations, a separate standard for corpora-
tions would serve an important public interest. Because a
corporation is an artificial entity, it apparently cannot be arrested
or extradited.145 It may be possible to arrest or extradite corpo-
rate officers or directors to effectively compel an appearance by
the corporation, but this is a coercive measure and may not be
practical in all situations. The only means of legally securing the
appearance of a corporation in a criminal proceeding is through
service of summons.1 46 Thus the corporation, because of its
fictional character, has more discretion as to whether it will ap-
pear in a proceeding than does a natural person who can be ar-
138. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
139. Miles v. State, 222 Ind. 312, 314-15, 53 N.E.2d 779, 780-81 (1944).
140. Brown v. State, 372 P.2d 785, 789 (Alaska 1962).
141. Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F.2d 318, 319 (8th Cir. 1945).
142. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
143. Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911).
144. See authorities cited note 143 supra.
145. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 118 N.H. 398, 404, 388 A.2d 190, 194 (1978); Peo-
ple v. Consolidated Edison Co., 42 Misc. 2d 422, 423-24, 248 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (1964).
146. People v. Consolidated Edison Co., 42 Misc. 2d 422,423-24,248 N.Y.S.2d 267,
268 (1964).
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rested. The unavailability of arrest or extradition should not be
allowed to provide potential immunity from prosecution. A corpo-
ration should be held to a separate jurisdictional standard so that
the public policy favoring prosecution of criminal offenders can be
enforced.
The application of the constitutional and statutory extradition
provisions to corporations requires an additional consideration. It
can be argued that, because the Constitution provides a mecha-
nism for securing the physical presence of a criminal defendant
who is outside the state's territory, 47 the use of summons by a
court to compel an appearance by a foreign corporation is uncon-
stitutional unless the corporation is "present" within the state.
But this argument assumes the rendition clause is protective of
individual rights. On the contrary, the provision for extradition
was developed and historically interpreted as a legal and moral
duty of states to deliver fugitives. 148
Most states have now supplemented the constitutional provi-
sion for extradition with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.149
The Act provides that a person who commits an act intentionally
resulting in a crime in a state may be extradited into that state,
whether or not that person was present in the state at the time
the crime was committed. 50 As with the rendition clause, the ba-
sic goal of the Act is not to create new individual rights but to ex-
pand criminal jurisdiction.151 Rights that are afforded a fugitive in
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act involve the application of
uniform and fair extradition procedures. 152 Because a foreign cor-
poration cannot be extradited, if it is brought before a court by
summons, the corporation should not be allowed to utilize the
existence of extradition procedures as a shield to prevent jurisdic-
tion.
147. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 2.
148. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 131 (1918); In re Strauss,
197 U.S. 324, 326 (1905). It has generally been held that the rendition clause should
be liberally construed to effect the return of fugitives. Appleyard v. Massachu-
setts, 203 U.S. 222 (1907).
149. Hardy v. Betz, 105 N.H. 169, 196, 195 A.2d 582, 586 (1963).
150. UNIFORM CRmnnH,. EXTrIION ACT 6. Even though under the same cir-
cumstances extradition would not be allowed under the rendition provision of the
Constitution, the state supplementary provision is not unconstitutional. Morgan v.
Horrall, 175 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949).
151. Morgan v. Horrall, 175 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949).
152. Id.
The Corporation: Criminal Accountability
The doctrine of legal accountability in criminal prosecutions is
an additional example of a separate standard for corporations.
The question of legal accountability of corporations for criminal
offenses was analyzed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co. 153 The court held that
the defendants' relationships as parent companies were sufficient
to charge the defendants with the acts of their agents, the subsidi-
aries and business trusts located within the state.1
54
The defendants argued that no Massachusetts case was disposi-
tive on the issue of whether a corporation may be held accounta-
ble for the offenses of an agent involving specific criminal intent.
This reasoning is premised on a fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence-that for serious offenses guilt is personal and not
vicarious.15s The court noted that the theory of vicarious liability
may be an inadequate basis for imposing criminal liability on a
natural person, although it has generally been applied in favor of
corporate criminal accountability.156 Because a corporation acts
only through agents, it can be treated differently from a natural
person for purposes of criminal intent. 5 7 The imposition of cor-
porate criminal liability involves the question of when the acts
and intent of a natural person can be treated as the acts and in-
tent of the corporation itself.158
The Supreme Court in New York Central & Hudson River Rail-
road v. United States 59 was confronted by the same issue when
it upheld the constitutionality of a statute which specifically ren-
dered corporations liable for the acts of their officers, agents, or
employees.160 The Court stated that public policy favored the lia-
bility of a corporation that had profited by the transaction of an
agent.161 To grant immunity from punishment would virtually
preclude the correction of the abuses sought to be eliminated.162
This policy objective cited by the Court applies with equal force
153. 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
154. Id. at 294, 275 N.E.2d at 94.
155. Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 206 N.E.2d 672, 679 (1965).
156. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 264-65, 275 N.E.2d 33,
77 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
157. See Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARv. L.
REv. 689, 721-22 (1930).
158. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 264-65 275 N.E.2d 33, 77
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
159. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
160. Id. at 496.
161. Id. at 493-96.
162. Id. at 496. See generally Elldns, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An
Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73 (1976); Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: A
Principle Extended to its Limit, 38 FED. B.J. 49 (1979).
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to the question of corporate criminal jurisdiction. The privilege of
presence at a criminal trial should not be utilized to create insula-
tion or immunity for corporations from criminal prosecution.
Minimum Contacts as a Workable Standard
In criminal jurisdiction, the remaining constitutional interest
for a corporation is that it be given notice of the proceedings and
that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. The application of
a minimum contacts standard requires practical evaluation. If
states were given unlimited jurisdictional power over corpora-
tions, one could argue that there is the risk that states might at-
tempt to regulate criminal conduct that occurs outside of their
territorial limits.
The possibility of unreasonable extensions of state regulation is
precluded by the limitations of criminal subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Unlike in civil cases, a state court has no extraterritorial ju-
risdiction in criminal matters because the criminal law of a state
has no operation or effect beyond the state's geographic limits.1
63
This would prevent attempts to regulate conduct occurring wholly
outside of the state. In addition, when the conduct occurs within
the state, the restriction on jurisdiction by outside courts indi-
cates the reasonableness of exercise of jurisdiction by the courts
of that state.
The adoption of a minimum contacts standard would provide
uniform criteria for corporate personal jurisdiction among the
states. As illustrated by the Luv and Beneficial cases, there is
uncertainty as to what the present jurisdictional criteria are.1
64
The adoption of a minimum contacts standard for criminal juris-
diction would eliminate the obsolete notion of "corporate pres-
ence." Although early courts may have reconciled the concept of
legal presence with corporate transactions of local character, sig-
nificant changes in the national economy have rendered the no-
tion unworkable.165 Technological progress in transportation and
communications have led to a fundamental transformation of
business activity, so that today many corporate transactions
touch two or more states.16 6 The Supreme Court in International
163. Hardy v. Betz, 105 N.H. 169, 173-75, 195 A.2d 582, 585 (1963).
164. See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
165. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
166. Id. See also authorities cited note 1 supra.
Shoe recognized that this fictional concept of "corporate pres-
ence" was no longer a workable standard.167 The reasons that led
to the demise of the "presence" standard in civil jurisdiction are
also applicable to criminal jurisdiction.
Finally, the very involvement of a corporate entity in criminal
conduct is problematic when a state attempts to regulate in this
area. The artificial and inanimate nature of the corporation ren-
ders uncertain the range of constitutional protections that a cor-
poration may invoke when prosecuted.168 As the reliance of
states upon criminal sanctions to deter corporate crime increases,
the adoption of a uniform and definite standard for jurisdiction
can only serve to make state regulation more effective. The prac-
tical employment of the minimum contacts standard in criminal
cases would likely involve less controversy and would result in a
more equitable result than found in civil cases. In a criminal
case, the occurrence of the offense itself could provide the requi-
site reasonable affiliation with the prosecuting state.
CONCLUSION
Historically, in both civil and criminal courts, jurisdiction was
premised upon the notion of presence. The application of the
early standard for jurisdiction required development of the legal
concept of "corporate presence." In civil cases this symbolic
fiction has been abandoned in favor of the minimum contacts
standard. Criminal courts, either because of uncertainties about
the extent of corporate constitutional privileges or because of the
problems that could be involved in the application of the standard
to natural persons, have failed to adopt the minimum contacts
standard for corporations. The only remaining jurisdictional re-
quirement for corporations in criminal cases is that they be given
notice of the proceeding and that the exercise of jurisdiction be
reasonable. The adoption of a minimum contacts standard for
corporations in criminal cases would provide uniformity among
the states, eliminate the need to perpetuate the antedated con-
cept of "corporate presence," and allow criminal courts to more
adequately deal with the economic realities of corporate activity
in modern society.
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167. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
168. See 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227 (1979).
